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Abstract 
This paper examines whether the establishment of the euro caused structural breaks in the main 
macroeconomic relationships of member countries. It compares eight original members of the common 
currency with four European countries that did not join. The analysis constructs counterfactuals using 
both single equation models and a six equation vector autoregression with foreign exogenous variables, 
VARX*, explaining output, inflation, equity prices, exchange rates and short and long interest rates. It 
considers which equations changed the most and the most likely dates for any structural break. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
 
This paper attempts to examine the effect of the establishment of the euro on eight 
economies that joined the common currency in comparison to four European economies that 
did not join the euro. There are very many ways to measure the effect of the euro and the 
most common way is to compare the outcome with some counterfactual, though 
constructing macroeconomic counterfactuals raises various difficult issues. Here we will use 
a very specific measure of the effect. We examine the extent to which joining the euro 
changed the main national macroeconomic relationships, that is whether there was a 
structural break in particular equations. We will ask: whether there was a significant break 
in 1999 for the economies that joined the euro and whether any break was bigger for those 
countries that joined than for countries that did not join. We also consider: in which 
equations the largest break occurred and whether the break was in 1999, or at another time. 
The answers to these questions will always be conditional on other influences that we 
control for. We always control for foreign variables, the 2008 crisis, for instance, was 
global. Of course, to the extent that the foreign variables were also influenced by the 
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formation of the euro we do not pick up that indirect effect. We also consider controlling for 
policy instruments, interest rates and exchange rates, which, once the common currency was 
established, might be regarded as exogenous to many, if not all, individual euro countries. 
There is also an issue as to whether to use a simple single equation approach of the sort 
discussed in Pesaran and Smith (2016) or a full system of the sort discussed in Pesaran and 
Smith (2018). Simple single equation models are parsimonious, there is a lot of evidence 
that parsimonious models forecast better and counterfactuals are conditional forecasts. On 
the other hand the systems allow for more feedbacks. We will use both. 
Section 2 reviews the literature. Section 3 describes the data and provides some 
descriptive statistics and history. Section 4 uses single equation models and examines the timing 
of structural breaks. Section 5 describes the econometric approach adopted for the systems 
analysis. Section 6 provides results for systems. Section 7 contains some concluding comments.  
 
2. LITERATURE 
 
There is a large literature on the euro which considers such issues as whether the euro is 
an optimal currency area and the extent to which its members are subject to symmetric shocks. 
De Grauwe (2018) provides a text-book treatment of the economics of the monetary union. 
While a single currency means equality of nominal interest rates and exchange rates, it does 
not mean real equality. Real interest rates and real exchange rates diverged substantially 
among the euro economies. In addition, the differences in size, factor endowment productivity 
and political environment of the euro economies mean that a “one size fits all” setting of 
monetary policy is unlikely to be optimal for all members. The interest rate chosen by the ECB 
may be too low for booming countries and too high for those in recession. 
Indeed, a common currency does not translate into equality among EMU members. 
Creditor countries tend to have more power and try to impose tight fiscal disciplines on debtor 
countries, De Grauwe (2016). During the Euro-crisis at the end of the 2000s, this pushed the 
Southern countries that were already suffering from liquidity crisis into a deeper recession, as 
they were forced to reduce wages and price level relative to the creditor members of the union. 
Greece is not one of the countries in our sample, but Alogoskoufis (2019) examines the 
economic history of Greece over the past 40 years and concludes that despite the significant 
constraints implied by membership, there are bigger risks in leaving the euro area. 
Aksoy et al. (2002) noted that the determinants of the optimal interest rate are country-
specific and this may raise tension within Euroland when it comes to choosing the optimal 
monetary policy for the system. Following Rudebusch and Svensson (1999) they developed 
a model which approximates an ECB optimal linear feedback decision rule. They found that 
the spread between nationally desired interest rate and the one decided by the ECB is wider 
for smaller countries in the union. Moreover, this difference tends to be larger when 
countries that desire to stabilize their output find it impossible to choose their optimal 
interest rate and hence left in frustration unable to achieve their objective. Nonetheless, the 
authors claimed that having the ECB to choose the optimal interest rate for the union based 
on economic conditions of all the countries in the system improves welfare by reducing 
losses from the volatility of inflation and variability of output. These tend to be higher when 
the choice of the interest rate is based on the nationalistic objectives. 
There are also issues about the implications of a common monetary policy for fiscal 
policy and whether fiscal federalism is required, Farhi and Werning (2017). Single currency 
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members are not able to issue debt in a national currency making them susceptible to self-
fulfilling liquidity and solvency crises as investors are lacking a guarantee that cash will be 
available at the maturity date. This may push interest rates up and reduce liquidity available 
to the euro countries, De Grauwe (2013). Monetary union prevents members devaluing their 
currency, to remedy declining relative competitiveness. Instead, governments are forced to 
push their price level down by reducing the wages leading them to a deeper recession. Thus 
the economy’s ability to defend itself against asymmetric shocks is tightly connected to the 
flexibility of its wages and price level. 
De Grauwe and Ji (2013) provide evidence for the fragility hypothesis. They analysed the 
government bond markets of the EMU countries and used a control group of 14 ‘stand-alone’ 
developed countries for comparison. ‘Stand-alone’ countries demonstrated much higher ability 
to sustain their sovereign debts as increase in their debt to GDP ratios was not perceived by 
financial market participants as a sign of increased fragility. As a result these countries 
overcame 2010-11 crisis without a noticeable increase in the interest rate spread. In contrast, 
the euro countries experienced a break in the spreads-debt to GDP ratio in 2010-11 as their 
financial vulnerability increased substantially when they accumulated public debt during times 
of financial distress. Thus, EMU countries are more prone to self-fulfilling liquidity crises. 
Saka et al. (2015) provided further empirical support for the fragility hypothesis. Using 
a capital asset pricing model, they found evidence for the herding contagion that was 
effectively countered by the timely and reassuring ECB announcements that helped to 
reduce investors fear of losses and effectively addressed self-fulfilling nature of the crisis 
during late 2000s. Nevertheless, the analysis relies on the influence of Spain-specific news 
on market participants and might have been different if the estimations were based on the 
news of other EMU members. 
Potjagailo (2017) noted that monetary shocks generated within the Eurozone tend to 
spillover on the ‘stand-alone’ European countries. The size of the spillover effects on each 
individual country depends on country-specific characteristics, such as its openness to trade. 
However, in case of majority of countries under consideration, financial variables, including 
short interest rates and real effective exchange rates, are significantly affected by the shocks 
originated in the Eurozone. As for common currency unions, when member economies are 
pushed ‘out of sync’ by shocks that are permanent, not only the nature, De Grauwe (2016), 
but also direction and extent of these shocks matter when estimating their effect on the 
flexibility-symmetry trade-off (Campos and Macchiarelli, 2018). 
Those are mainly macroeconomic issues. The benefits of a monetary union may lie at 
the microeconomic level, De Grauwe (2018). A single currency aids free movement of 
goods and capital inside the EMU and reduced uncertainty about expected exchange rate. 
Hence, an increased economic efficiency for all the members in the monetary union. 
Campos and Macchiarelli (2018) argue that creation of EMU improved the stability of the 
Euro Area. They distinguish between core, deep-rooted periphery and a mixed set of countries. 
The authors found that an economy is more likely to be a core country if it was a euro member 
and had strict product market regulations in place. The euro countries benefit from reduced 
transaction costs and uncertainty about exchange rate, as well as from price transparency, higher 
trade and competition. However, to fully enjoy the perks of being an EMU member, an economy 
needs to be able to achieve a minimum combination of symmetry, flexibility and openness. 
There has been considerable dispute about the effect of monetary union on trade and 
Rose (2017) analyses the factors that cause the estimates to vary so much. It appears that 
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estimates are sensitive to the sample size with the effects of a single currency on trade being 
stronger if the analysis includes more observations by country and time. The number of 
countries included seems to make especially substantial difference, which, as Rose suggested, 
might be explained by the bias in the estimation of the country-time fixed effects that arises if 
some smaller economies are omitted from the sample. 
Besides development of the monetary union, various global disturbances could have 
affected welfare of the Euro members over the period covered in this paper. The Euro countries 
were not exempt from the harsh effects of the global crisis 2007-08. Caruso et al. (2018) 
analysed the effects of the financial crisis 2007-08 on the Euro countries. Using a multivariate 
VAR model they performed conditional and unconditional forecasts in order to examine a 
special nature of a financial crisis, that they argued, is different from a regular recession. They 
found major deviations in output, private and public debt ratios and other macroeconomic and 
financial indicators of the Euro countries, when the model was estimated over pre- and post-crisis 
periods. Some of these deviations, such as persistent decline in investment, are atypical to the 
extent that they, as the authors argued, cannot be explained by the business cycle regularities. 
The crisis was also characterised by the record high fiscal deficit-GDP ratios followed by an 
adaptation of extremely tight fiscal policies, all of which make this crisis unprecedented and 
likely to cause a structural change in the macroeconomic indicators of some Euro countries. 
In studies that are more closely related to what we are doing Pesaran et al. (2007) 
estimate what would have happened to the UK and Sweden and the euro area if the UK or 
Sweden had joined the euro using a Global Vector Autoregression, GVAR. Smith (2009) 
examines whether the establishment of the euro caused a structural break. In both cases there 
was a relatively short sample of data after the establishment of the euro and the samples ended 
prior to the financial crisis. In both cases the effects were not large. Now there is more data 
and the large shocks associated with the financial crisis provides extra identifying information. 
 
3. DATA 
 
We use data from the GVAR toolbox 1979Q3-2016Q4, Mohaddes and Raissi (2018), 
to estimate VARX* for a number of European countries that did or did not join the euro. 
For countries i=1,2,..,12 and t=1979Q2−2016Q4, the variables are: 
• 𝑦𝑖𝑡 natural logarithm of real GDP volume index 
• ∆𝑝𝑖𝑡  the rate of inflation, calculated by taking the difference of the natural 
logarithm of the consumer price index 
• 𝑒𝑞𝑖𝑡  natural logarithm of the nominal equity price index deflated by CPI 
• 𝑒𝑝𝑖𝑡 natural logarithm of the exchange rate of country i at time t expressed in units 
of foreign currency per US dollar deflated by country i’s CPI. We will refer to this as a real 
exchange rate, even though it is not adjusted for the US price level. 
• 𝑟𝑖𝑡  nominal short-term interest rate per quarter, in per cent; computed as 0.25 ×
ln(1 + 𝑅𝑖𝑡
𝑟 ) /100 where 𝑅𝑖𝑡
𝑟  is the nominal short rate of interest per annum in percent. 
• 𝑙𝑖𝑡 nominal long-term interest rate per quarter, in per cent; computed as 0.25 ×
ln(1 + 𝑅𝑖𝑡
𝑙𝑟) /100 where 𝑅𝑖𝑡
𝑙𝑟  is the nominal long rate of interest per annum in percent. 
• 𝑝𝑜𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡  natural logarithm of the nominal price of oil in US dollars  
The euro-member countries we consider are: Austria, Belgium, Finland, France, 
Germany, Italy, Netherlands, Spain. The non-euro members are: Norway, Sweden, 
Switzerland, UK. The long interest rate is not available for Finland. 
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In addition to individual variables, say 𝑥𝑖𝑡 , there are global equivalents 𝑥𝑖𝑡
∗  calculated as 
country specific trade weighted averages of the corresponding variables of the other countries: 
 
𝑥𝑖𝑡
∗ = ∑ 𝑤𝑖𝑗𝑥𝑗𝑡
𝑁
𝑗=0 , with 𝑤𝑖𝑖 = 0, 
where 𝑤𝑖𝑗 is the share of country j in the trade (exports plus imports) of country i. So for 
instance if 𝑦𝑖𝑡  is log real GDP, 𝑦𝑖𝑡
∗  is the weighted average of the log GDP of trading partners. 
 
For each country, we break the data into three periods, as follows 1:1979Q4-1998Q4; 
2:1999Q1-2008Q4; 3: 2009Q1-2016Q4. Table no. 1 provides means and standard deviations 
for the growth rate, the rate of inflation, the change in the real exchange rate, and the long 
rate (excluding Finland). 
 
Table no. 1 – Mean and standard deviation, percent per annum (x400) 
 Dy Dp Dep Lr 
 1 2 3 1 2 3 1 2 3 1 2 3 
Austria 2.28 2.00 1.08 3.14 1.99 1.70 -3.70 -2.28 0.93 7.19 4.10 2.15 
 3.66 3.58 4.26 2.08 1.14 1.25 20.34 20.86 15.91 1.51 0.49 1.22 
Belgium 1.94 1.91 1.14 3.49 2.23 1.55 -2.56 -2.51 1.07 8.72 4.38 2.47 
 3.23 2.79 2.32 2.67 1.73 1.69 20.41 20.64 15.76 2.32 0.64 1.33 
Finland 2.51 2.63 0.09 4.66 1.90 1.18 -3.13 -2.20 1.45 0.00 0.00 0.00 
 5.65 4.42 6.01 3.55 1.60 1.71 20.63 20.62 15.80 0.00 0.00 0.00 
France 1.84 1.82 0.77 4.52 1.77 0.92 -3.01 -2.05 1.70 9.20 4.32 2.20 
 1.78 2.32 1.82 4.04 1.19 1.14 19.38 20.85 15.77 2.85 0.61 1.11 
Germany 1.89 1.35 1.32 2.74 1.62 1.12 -3.10 -1.91 1.51 6.88 4.11 1.65 
 3.78 2.67 3.79 2.18 1.17 1.03 20.21 20.74 15.79 1.43 0.46 1.07 
Italy 1.89 0.97 -0.38 7.50 2.33 1.12 -3.79 -2.62 1.51 11.72 4.48 3.63 
 2.65 2.31 3.12 5.50 0.83 1.37 20.11 20.74 15.72 3.66 0.49 1.46 
Netherlands 2.31 1.90 0.45 2.68 2.18 1.44 -2.92 -2.48 1.19 7.42 4.35 1.97 
 3.26 2.43 2.83 2.14 1.25 1.42 20.27 20.46 15.81 1.56 0.66 1.13 
Norway 3.21 2.05 1.43 5.30 2.15 1.99 -3.12 -3.06 0.60 9.55 4.76 1.94 
 5.33 3.78 5.17 3.71 3.17 2.05 18.06 22.40 18.05 2.69 1.11 0.85 
Spain 2.51 2.82 0.43 6.99 3.12 0.66 -2.99 -3.41 1.96 11.54 4.17 3.66 
 1.88 2.20 2.48 4.07 1.67 3.28 20.00 21.11 16.11 3.15 0.61 1.54 
Sweden 1.91 2.30 2.63 5.51 1.61 0.65 -2.08 -1.89 1.17 10.10 4.40 1.91 
 5.64 4.50 4.11 4.37 1.63 1.52 21.21 21.98 19.38 2.12 0.71 0.97 
Switzerland 1.64 1.82 1.36 2.78 1.09 -0.30 -3.61 -3.04 -1.26 4.62 2.88 0.87 
 2.82 3.94 2.79 2.33 1.12 1.13 22.94 16.45 15.47 0.90 0.44 0.83 
UK 2.21 2.02 1.36 5.37 2.28 2.08 -3.80 -1.51 0.74 9.39 4.59 2.52 
 2.86 2.86 2.01 3.74 1.31 1.68 21.36 17.42 16.13 2.10 0.24 0.85 
Notes: Dy is the GDP growth rate, Dp is the rate of inflation, Dep is the change in the exchange rate, Lr is the long 
interest rate. The information are given for periods: 1: 1979Q4-1998Q4; 2: 1999Q1-2008Q4; 3: 2009Q1-2016Q4. 
 
In the three year period after 1999 most of the countries suffered from lower growth, 
compared to the pre-euro period. The exceptions were Finland, Spain, Sweden, and 
Switzerland, who enjoyed a minor increase in the GDP growth rate. Moreover, growth is 
lower in the post crisis period, but this is a global phenomenon not just for euro countries. 
We control for this by including global variables 𝑥𝑖𝑡
∗  in our model. 
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The average inflation rate dropped during the period of euro formation. For most 
countries the inflation rate more than halved and in some cases, such as Italy it fell by more 
than two thirds. As for the euro countries, under the EMU, money supply and inflation were 
now closely coordinated by the the European Central Bank, ECB. However, it does not 
explain the decrease in inflation rates in the stand-alone countries. The inflation rate was 
maintained at a relatively stable rate after the financial crisis. 
The average exchange rate growth over the first two sub-periods was negative, suggesting 
appreciation against US dollar. However, following the financial crisis, the dollar strengthened 
against national currencies of the countries in the sample. The long interest rate declined 
significantly during the years of euro formation, partially as a result of the strict anti-
inflationary policy adopted by the ECB, and fell further in the third period, possibly due to low 
expected inflation and returns on investments. Average growth rates fell over the three periods 
both for the 8 euro countries: 2.15, to 1.92, 0.62, and for the 4 non-euro countries: 2.24, 2.05, 
1.69. While the non-euro average is higher The differences are quite small for the first two 
periods, but in the post crisis period the four euro countries grew faster than any of the eight 
euro countries. Inflation fell over the three periods in both groups. 
 
4. SINGLE EQUATION MODEL 
 
In the comparisons of growth rates in the descriptive statistics above we did not control 
for other factors, particularly the crisis, we now do that. To begin we estimate a simple 
single equation model that makes the log of real GDP an ARDL function of foreign GDP 
and trend over the pre-euro period 1979Q2-1998Q4, say 𝑡 = 1,2, … , 𝑇1:  
 
𝑦𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼0 + 𝛼1𝑦𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛽0𝑦𝑖𝑡
∗ + 𝛽1𝑦𝑖,𝑡−1
∗ + 𝛾𝑡 + 𝑢𝑡 (1) 
 
This equation is then used to forecast GDP over the following 𝑇2 quarters, 𝑡 = 𝑇1 +
1, 𝑇1 + 2,… , 𝑇, with 𝑇2 = 𝑇 − 𝑇1. The counterfactual here is the value of output that would 
be predicted from pre 1999 parameters using post 1999 information on foreign variables.  
We use a number of tests for structural stability. Chow’s first test is for equality of the 
k=5 parameters between the two periods, assuming the variances are the same. It uses the 
unrestricted residual sum of squares of the regressions over the two periods (?̂?1′?̂?1 + ?̂?2′?̂?2) 
with degrees of freedom T−2k and restricted residual sum of squares from the regression 
over the whole period ?̂?′?̂? with degrees of freedom T−k. The null hypothesis that the 
parameters are equal in the two periods implies k restrictions and the test statistic is: 
 
[?̂?′?̂? − (?̂?1′?̂?1 + ?̂?2′?̂?2)] 𝑘⁄
(?̂?1′?̂?1 + ?̂?2′?̂?2) (𝑇 − 2𝑘)⁄
~𝐹(𝑘, 𝑇 − 2𝑘) 
 
Chow also suggested a second predictive failure test for the hypothesis that the first 
period predicts the second where the test statistic is:  
 
[?̂?′?̂? − ?̂?1′?̂?1] 𝑇2⁄
?̂?1′?̂?1 (𝑇1 − 2𝑘)⁄
~𝐹(𝑇2, 𝑇1 − 𝑘) 
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This tests the hypothesis that in: 
 
[
𝑦1
𝑦2
] = [
𝑋1 0
𝑋2 𝐼
] [
𝛽1
𝛿
] + [
𝑢1
0
] 
δ, the T1×1 vector of forecast errors, are not significantly different from zero. This has a 
dummy variable for each observation in the second period. 
 
Table no. 2 gives the Chow Predictive Failure, PF, and Structural Stability, SS, tests p-
values, mean and root mean square prediction errors for a break in 1999Q1. Plots of actual 
and predicted values are given in an Annex. These Chow tests assume a known break-point, 
but there are also Quandt-Andrews tests for an unknown break point, which searches over 
the possible dates for a single break. The trimming percentage is set to 15%. Table no. 2 
also gives the Q-A break date, all are significant. 
For Austria the predicted is close to the actual with a small mean error and RMSPE. 
Neither the PF nor SS test rejects the hypothesis of structural stability at the 5% level. 
The countries which performed less well than expected from the pre-euro relationship 
are Italy, Netherlands, and Norway. Their mean errors and RMSPEs are on a higher end, 
comparing to the rest of the sample. Moreover, the Chow SS test statistics suggests possible 
structural instability in growth rates of Italy and Norway at 5% level and that of Netherlands 
at 10% level. 
 
Table no. 2 – Structural Break in 1999Q1: log GDP 
 PF SS 
Mean PE RMSPE Q-A Test 
 F(72, 72) F(5, 139) 
Austria 0.49 0.05 0.01 0.02 1988Q3*** 
Belgium 1.00 0.00 0.05 0.06 1987Q3*** 
Finland 0.99 0.08 0.10 0.11 1990Q2*** 
France 0.94 0.00 0.04 0.04 1998Q2*** 
Germany 1.00 0.04 0.00 0.08 1988Q3*** 
Italy 0.99 0.00 -0.07 0.09 2003Q1*** 
Netherlands 1.00 0.09 -0.06 0.08 1986Q1*** 
Norway* 0.91 0.03 -0.11 0.15 1987Q3*** 
Spain 0.14 0.02 -0.09 0.15 2008Q2*** 
Sweden* 1.00 0.02 0.15 0.17 1990Q1*** 
Switzerland* 0.01 0.00 0.13 0.16 2008Q2*** 
UK* 0.68 0.00 -0.59 0.83 2008Q2*** 
Notes: PF: Chow Predictive failure test; SS: Chow Structural stability test; Mean PE: Mean Prediction 
Errors; RMSPE: Root Mean Squared Prediction Error; Q-A Test: Quandt-Andrews Test (*** indicates a 
significance level of 1 percent, ** of 5 percent, and * of 10 percent); *: non-member countries. 
 
The countries which performed better than expected from the pre-euro relationship are 
Belgium, Finland, France, Sweden, and Switzerland. Chow SS test suggests presence of 
structural instability in time series of all these countries, except Finland. In case of Switzerland 
this conclusion is supported by the Chow PF statistics as well. Sweden and Switzerland have 
the highest mean prediction errors and RMSPE in the sample, excluding the UK. The UK 
results are unreliable because the coefficient of the lagged dependent variable was greater than 
one on the pre-euro period. 
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The countries where the evidence is mixed are Germany and Spain. For Germany the 
predicted growth rate was higher than the actual one and was expected to decline around 
2011. However, contrary to this prediction, ever since a sharp drop during the global crisis 
2007-08, the actual growth rate has been slowly increasing. For Spain the actual was close 
to the predicted till the global crisis, after which the actual growth rate dropped below the 
predicted one and continued to increase at a much slower pace than was predicted. 
Overall, for majority of countries in the sample their actual and predicted growth rates 
are not necessarily close to each other, but exhibit similar general patters. Only in case of 
Spain, Germany, Switzerland, and the UK the actual and predicted income growth rates 
diverge substantially from each other. 
In Finland the break occurred in early 1990s (1990Q2), time of Finnish banking crisis and 
collapse of the Soviet Union, with which Finland had strong trading ties. In case of Sweden the 
Q-A test identified a break in 1990Q1, which might be connected to the Swedish banking crisis 
that erupted in 1992. For Spain, Switzerland, and the UK, the Q-A test statistics suggests a 
breakpoint in 2008Q2, year of the global financial crisis. As for the rest of the countries, the 
identified breakpoints are not characterised by any major economic or financial events. 
The Bai-Perron test which allows for multiple breakpoints was also used, but did not 
suggest that Euro formation was a reason behind the breaks in the data for any of the 
countries in the sample. 
We also estimate a growth rate relationship below: 
 
∆𝑦𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼0
′ + 𝛼1
′∆𝑦𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛽0
′∆𝑦𝑖𝑡
∗ + 𝛽1
′∆𝑦𝑖,𝑡−1
∗ + 𝜖𝑡 (2) 
where ∆𝑦𝑖𝑡 and ∆𝑦𝑖𝑡
∗  are real domestic and foreign GDP growth rates, respectively, and 𝜖 is 
the error term. 
 
This equation is then used to forecast GDP growth rate as with the levels relationship 
over the following 𝑇2 quarters, 𝑡 = 𝑇1 + 1, 𝑇1 + 2,… , 𝑇, with 𝑇2 = 𝑇 − 𝑇1.  
Compared to the levels relationship, the results for the growth equation are quite 
different. In Austria and Belgium overall foreign income growth effect is positive, but the 
lagged foreign GDP is only significant at 5% level in Belgium and insignificant in Austria. 
In addition, coefficient of the lagged national income is negative and in case of Belgium, 
insignificant. The equations, however, passed all the diagnostic tests, except the Belgium 
equation, which failed the serial correlation test at 10% level. 
In case of Finland, France, Germany, Italy, and Netherlands only the foreign income 
growth coefficient is significant and positive. The equation for France passed all the 
diagnostic tests, while the ones for Finland and Germany failed serial correlation test. As for 
Italy, the equation failed serial correlation and normality tests. The equation for Netherlands 
failed normality and functional form tests, the latter only at 10% level. 
In the Norway equation foreign income growth has significant positive effect on home 
GDP growth. However, lagged domestic income growth has negative and significant effect 
on the dependent variable. This equation passed all the diagnostic tests. 
In case of Spain lagged domestic income growth and foreign income growth have positive 
effect on domestic GDP growth, but the foreign coefficient is only significant at 10% level. 
However, the equation failed serial correlation test and normality test, the latter only at 10% 
level. In Sweden, both foreign income growth and lagged domestic GDP growth coefficients 
are significant, although the former is positive, while the latter is negative. The equation passed 
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all the diagnostic tests. In case of Switzerland and the UK, the foreign income growth and 
lagged domestic income growth have positive and significant effect on the dependent variable 
and the Switzerland equation passed all the diagnostic tests, while the UK one failed those for 
serial correlation at 5% level, as well as functional form and normality at 10% level. 
The lagged foreign income is insignificant in all countries equations with exception of 
Belgium where it is significant at 10% level. Nonetheless, comparing to the levels 
specification model, the lagged foreign income growth coefficient is positive in all equations, 
except Finland, France, and Norway, with overall foreign income growth effect being positive 
for all countries. All equations passed functional form test (Netherlands and the UK failed it, 
but only at 10% level) and heteroskedasticity test, however Belgium (at 10% level), Finland, 
Germany, Italy, Spain, and the UK failed the serial correlation test and four failed the 
normality test (Italy and Netherlands at 5%, while Spain and the UK at 10% level). 
 
Table no. 3 – Structural Break Analysis (Income Growth) 
 PF SS Mean PE RMSPE 
Q-A Test 
 F(72,73) F(4,141) Annual % Annual % 
Austria 0.49 0.75 -0.28 3.22 1988Q2 
Belgium 1.00 0.59 0.35 1.76 1986Q3** 
Finland 1.00 0.05 -0.62 3.89 1988Q1*** 
France 0.94 0.34 -0.20 1.35 2001Q4 
Germany 1.00 0.88 0.09 1.89 1988Q3* 
Italy 1.00 0.01 -1.17 1.88 2003Q1*** 
Netherlands 1.00 0.14 -0.64 1.85 1986Q1** 
Norway* 0.94 0.31 -1.27 4.36 1986Q2* 
Spain 0.00 0.12 -0.59 2.14 2000Q2 
Sweden* 0.99 0.03 1.22 3.30 1994Q2** 
Switzerland* 0.06 0.08 0.62 2.95 2008Q4 
UK* 1.00 0.69 -0.18 1.84 1986Q1 
Notes: PF: Chow Predictive failure test; SS: Chow Structural stability test; Mean PE: Mean Prediction 
Errors; RMSPE: Root Mean Squared Prediction Error; Q-A Test: Quandt-Andrews Test (*** indicates a 
significance level of 1 percent, ** of 5 percent, and * of 10 percent); *: non-member countries. 
 
Moving to the structural stability analysis, similarly to the levels equations, Table no. 3 
summarises the p-values for the PF and SS tests, mean errors and RMSPE for a break in 1999Q1, 
as well as Q-A test breakpoints. Plots of actual and predicted values are given in an Annex. 
For Germany the predicted is closest to the actual with the smallest mean prediction 
error in a sample, 0.09%. However, RMSPE is the smallest for France, 1.35% and its mean 
PE is also relatively small, -0.20%, suggesting that the country performed slightly worse 
than expected from the pre-euro relationship. In both cases, Germany and France, neither 
the PF nor SS test rejects the hypothesis of structural stability. However, Q-A test identified 
potential breakpoint for Germany in 1988Q3, but it is only significant at 10% level. 
Similarly to France, the UK and Austria also performed a bit worse than expected, with 
the mean PE of -0.18% and -0.28%, respectively. The tests do not indicate either parameter 
instability or predictive failure. Spain, Finland, Netherlands, Italy, and Norway performed 
even less well with their negative mean errors and RMSPEs are on a higher end, comparing 
to the rest of the sample. Furthermore, in case of Spain both, Chow PF and SS tests, suggest 
possible structural instability. In Italy and Finland there is indication of parameter change, 
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but not predictive failure (in case of Finland, at 10% level only). The Q-A test suggest a 
breakpoint in 1988Q1 in Finland and in 2003Q1 in Italy and in 1986Q1 in the Netherlands, 
as well as, in 1986Q2 in Norway (only significant at 10% level). 
Moving to the countries which performed better than expected from the pre-euro 
relationship are Belgium, Switzerland, and most of all Sweden with the highest mean PE of 
1.22% in the sample. While Chow PF and SS tests find no signs of structural instability in 
Belgium time series, the Q-A test suggest a possible breakpoint in 1986Q3. Both tests, 
Chow PF and SS, reject the null hypothesis of structural stability for Switzerland, but only at 
10% level and the Q-A finds no structural breaks in this time series. Finally, Chow SS 
suggests structural instability in case of Sweden and the Q-A finds a break in 1994Q2. 
Comparing the growth rate and levels relationship estimations, the Q-A test results are 
similar in case of Belgium and Norway, but very different for the Netherlands and Sweden. 
Interestingly the Q-A test does not identify a structural break around 1998-1999, third stage 
for the implementation of the EMU, neither when the relationship estimated in levels nor in 
first differences. However, for level models the Q-A finds significant breakpoints in all 
countries, while in growth rate models only in seven, even including breakpoints that are 
significant at 10% only. 
Furthermore, if in the levels relationships the SS test suggested structural instability in all 
countries (three of them, Austria, Finland and the Netherlands, are only significant at 10% 
level), in the growth rate estimations it rejects the null only in four countries (in Finland and 
Switzerland only at 10% level). Overall, it appears the growth rate form fits the data better. 
To consider how interest rate determination changed with the formation of the euro 
and the crisis, Taylor Rules were estimated for the pre-euro period, 1979Q4-1998Q4; the 
early pre-crisis euro period, 1999Q1-2008Q4; and the post crisis period 2009Q1-2016Q4. 
The estimated equation for each country made the short interest rate for each country, 𝑟𝑡 a 
function of its lagged value, the lagged rate of inflation, 𝜋𝑡−1, and the lagged log output gap, 
𝑦𝑡−1 − 𝑦𝑡−1
∗ . This takes the form: 
 
𝑟𝑡 = (1 − 𝜆)𝑟𝑡−1 + 𝜆 (𝜃∗ + 𝜃𝜋𝜋𝑡−1 + 𝜃𝑦(𝑦𝑡−1 − 𝑦𝑡−1
∗ )) + 𝑢𝑡 
 
Potential log output is approximated by a linear trend, so the estimated equation takes 
the form: 
 
𝑟𝑡 = 𝛼0 + 𝛼1𝑟𝑡−1 + 𝛽𝜋𝜋𝑡−1 + 𝛽𝑦𝑦𝑡−1 + 𝛾𝑡 + 𝑢𝑡 (3) 
 
In the pre-euro period both 𝛽𝑦 > 0 in every country and significant in all but three, while 
𝛽𝜋 > 0 in 10, significantly so in 3 and insignificantly negative in the Netherlands and Spain. 
The average value of 𝜃𝜋 was 0.17 with a standard deviation of 0.26, ranging from -0.53 in the 
Netherlands to 0.47 in Belgium. The average value of 𝜃𝑦 was 0.15 with a standard deviation of 
0.07, ranging from 0.06 in Sweden to 0.29 in the Netherlands In the second, early euro period 
5 countries show negative 𝛽𝜋 coefficients (Belgium, France, Italy, Netherlands and UK), none 
significantly negative, only Finland and Austria are significantly positive. 𝛽𝑦 was significantly 
positive in all countries except Switzerland. The results for the third post-crisis period are 
subject to the fact that interest rates moved relatively little over this period. There are two 
negative 𝛽𝜋, Switzerland and the UK, neither significantly so, and 3 significantly positive 
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Sweden, Italy, and Austria. There are now six negative 𝛽𝑦, Belgium, Netherlands, Norway 
(significant), Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, and only the UK one is significantly positive.  
For most countries the match between actual and predicted is fairly close until the 
crisis when the predicted interest rate falls sharply and the actual interest rate constrained by 
the zero lower bound cannot follow. With the exception of Sweden and Switzerland, 
predicted interest rates go sharply negative at the end of the sample, being below the actual. 
In Sweden and Switzerland, predicted is above actual for the whole period. In Germany the 
predicted is below the actual for the whole period. In Italy and Netherlands the predicted is 
below the actual from about 2002. The hypothesis of structural stability, no change in the 
parameters before and after the establishment of the euro is not rejected in Finland, Norway, 
Spain and Switzerland. Though the test is conditional on equality of variances, which is 
unlikely to be the case here. The standard error of regression for the pre-euro period is large 
relative to that for the two post euro periods. 
There is little in these results that would suggest a big difference between the euro 
members and non-members in this group. 
We proceed by estimating Taylor Rules using long-run interest rates with the estimated 
equation taking the following form:  
 
𝑙𝑟𝑡 = 𝛼0 + 𝛼1𝑙𝑟𝑡−1 + 𝛽𝜋𝜋𝑡−1 + 𝛽𝑦𝑦𝑡−1 + 𝛾𝑡 + 𝑢𝑡 (4) 
where 𝑙𝑟𝑡  is a nominal long-term interest rate per quarter. 
 
Our sample is one country short, because the long-term interest rate data is not 
available for Finland. 
In the pre-euro period 𝛽𝑦 is positive in every country and significant in all but four. The 
average value of 𝜃𝑦 was 0.11 with a standard deviation of 0.13, ranging from 0.02 in the UK to 
0.49 in Italy. As for inflation coefficients, 𝛽𝜋 is positive in all but one country, significantly so 
in three and insignificantly negative in Norway. The average value of 𝜃𝜋 was 0.20 with a 
standard deviation of 0.30. The coefficients of 𝜃𝜋 ranged from -0.11 in the Norway, to almost 
unity (0.97) in Italy. In the second period 𝛽𝜋 is negative for all countries except Germany, 
Italy, and Sweden, but none are significant. In contrast, 𝛽𝑦 was positive for all countries, but 
significantly so only for Austria, Germany, the Netherlands, and Norway. As for the post-crisis 
period, 𝛽𝜋 was positive for all countries except Norway, Switzerland, and the UK, but was 
insignificant for the whole sample. Moreover, 𝛽𝑦 is now insignificant for all countries and is 
negative for Germany, the Netherlands, Sweden, Switzerland, and the UK. 
As before, the results do not vary substantially between euro and non-euro members. 
The differences between actual and predicted are smaller for all countries when Taylor 
Rules are estimated using long-term interest rates instead of short-term ones. 
 
5. SYSTEMS APPROACH 
 
5.1 Theoretical model 
 
Although we are not going to use a structural model, we will set out how our estimated 
model relates to a fully specified structural model. Consider the following rational 
expectations (RE) model for a small open economy in the 𝑘 × 1 vector 𝒙𝑡 of endogenous 
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variables, determined in terms of their expected future values, past values, a 𝑘∗ × 1 vector of 
corresponding foreign variables, 𝒙𝑡
∗ which are treated as exogenous, and a 𝑘𝑑 × 1 vector of 
deterministic elements like trend and intercept:  
 
𝑨0(𝜑)𝒙𝑡 = 𝑨1(𝜑)𝐸𝑡(𝒙𝑡+1) + 𝑨2(𝜑)𝒙𝑡−1 + 𝑨3(𝜑)𝒙𝑡
∗ + 𝑨4(𝜑)𝒅𝑡 + 𝒖𝑡 (5) 
 
For the expected future values, 𝐸𝑡(𝒙𝑡+1) = 𝐸𝑡(𝒙𝑡+1|ℐ𝑡), the information set is ℐ𝑡 =
(𝒙𝑡 , 𝒙𝑡−1, … ; 𝒙𝑡
∗, 𝒙𝑡−1
∗ , … ). 𝑨𝑖(𝜑) are matrices of coefficients. For i=0,1,2, they are of 
dimension k×k, for i=3 dimension 𝑘 × 𝑘∗, for i=4, dimension 𝑘 × 𝑘𝑑. 𝑨0(𝜑) is non-singular, 
𝜑 is a vector of deep parameters, and 𝒖𝑡 is a k×1 vector of structural shocks. The exogenous 
variables are assumed to follow the VAR(1) model: 
 
𝒙𝑡
∗ = 𝒂(𝜌) + 𝑹(𝜌)𝒙𝑡−1
∗ + 𝜼𝑡 (6) 
where 𝒂(𝜌) is a 𝑘𝑥 × 1 vector of intercepts and 𝑹(𝜌) is the 𝑘𝑥 × 𝑘𝑥 matrix of coefficients 
that depend on a vector of unknown coefficients, 𝜌. This marginal model is required because 
forecasts of 𝒙𝑡
∗ are required to construct the expectations 𝐸𝑡(𝒙𝑡+1). The errors, 𝒖𝑡 and 𝜼𝑡 are 
assumed to be serially and cross sectionally uncorrelated, with zero means and constant 
variances, 𝚺𝑢, and 𝚺𝜂, respectively. 
 
If the quadratic matrix equation,  
 
𝑨1(𝜑)𝚽
2(𝜑) − 𝑨0(𝜑)𝚽(𝜑) + 𝑨2(𝜑) = 𝟎 
has a solution, 𝚽(𝜑), with all its eigenvalues inside the unit circle, then, the RE model, (5) 
and (6), has the unique solution1: 
 
𝒙𝑡 = 𝚽(𝜑)𝒙𝑡−1 +𝚿(𝜑, 𝜌)𝒙𝑡
∗ + 𝝁𝑎(𝜑, 𝜌)𝒅𝑡 + 𝚪(𝜑)𝒖𝑡 (7) 
 
The variance matrix of the reduced form shocks, 𝜀𝑡 = 𝚪(𝜑)𝒖𝑡 is  
 
𝚺𝜀(𝜑) = 𝐸(𝜀𝑡′𝜀𝑡) = 𝚪(𝜑)𝚺𝑢𝚪′(𝜑) 
 
Equation (7) is labeled a VARX* in the GVAR literature. It corresponds to the reduced 
form of a standard simultaneous equations model, when 𝑨1(𝜑) = 0 and there are no 
forward looking terms. It corresponds to a vector autoregression when there are no 
exogenous variables, so 𝑨3(𝜑) = 𝚿(𝜑, 𝜌) = 0. What is relevant for the case of the euro is 
that the parameters of (7) may change either because the parameters of the process 
generating the endogenous variables, 𝜑, change say from 𝜑1 to 𝜑2, or because the 
parameters of the process generating the exogenous variables, 𝜌, changes from 𝜌1 to 𝜌2. 
Changes in the process driving the exogenous variables could be important because they 
may change how people form their expectations, 𝐸𝑡(𝒙𝑡+1). 
 
5.2 VARX* 
 
The VARX* (7) was for a single country, now consider a set of countries i=0,1,2,...,N, 
with country 0, say the US, as the numeraire country: we use the exchange rate against the 
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dollar. Suppressing the dependence on the deep parameters, a second-order country-specific 
VARX*(2,2) model with deterministic trends can be written as: 
 
𝒙𝑖𝑡 = 𝑩𝑖𝑑𝒅𝑡 + 𝑩𝑖1𝒙𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝑩𝑖2𝒙𝑖,𝑡−2 +𝑩𝑖0
∗ 𝒙𝑖𝑡
∗ + 𝑩𝑖1
∗ 𝒙𝑖,𝑡−1
∗ +𝑩𝑖2
∗ 𝒙𝑖,𝑡−2
∗ + 𝒖𝑖𝑡 (8) 
where 𝒙𝑖𝑡 is a 𝑘1 × 1 (usually six) vector of domestic variables, 𝒙𝑖𝑡
∗  is a 𝑘𝑖
∗ × 1 vector of 
foreign variables specific to country i, and 𝒅𝑡 is a 𝑠 × 1 vector of deterministic elements as 
well as observed common variables, oil prices in our case: (1, 𝑡, 𝑝𝑡
𝑜). The 𝒙𝑖𝑡
∗  are calculated as 
country specific trade weighted averages of the corresponding variables of the other countries. 
 
𝒙𝑖𝑡
∗ = ∑ 𝑤𝑖𝑗𝒙𝑗𝑡
𝑁
𝑗=0 , with 𝑤𝑖𝑖 = 0, 
where 𝑤𝑖𝑗 is the share of country j in the trade (exports plus imports) of country i. 
 
In the case of small open economies it is reasonable to assume that the 𝒙𝑖𝑡
∗  are “long 
run forcing” or I(1) weakly exogenous, and then estimate the VARX* models separately for 
each country, allowing for cointegration both within 𝒙𝑖𝑡 and across 𝒙𝑖𝑡 and 𝒙𝑖𝑡
∗ 2. Tests for 
the weak exogeneity of 𝒙𝑖𝑡
∗  generally do not reject the hypothesis. The 𝒙𝑖𝑡
∗  would typically 
refer to the same variables as 𝒙𝑖𝑡, thus there is a symmetric structure to the model. 
The cointegrating VARX* can be written eq10as a VECM: 
 
∆𝒙𝑖𝑡 = 𝑩𝑖𝑑𝒅𝑡 +𝚷𝑖𝒛𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝑩𝑖0
∗ ∆𝒙𝑖𝑡
∗ + 𝚪𝑖∆𝒛𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝒖𝑖𝑡 (9) 
where 𝒛𝑖,𝑡 = (𝒙𝑖𝑡
′ , 𝒙𝑖𝑡
∗′)′. Restricting the deterministic terms and assuming that 𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑘(𝚷𝑖) =
𝑟𝑖 < 𝑘𝑖 + 𝑘𝑖
∗, we have 𝚷𝑖 = α𝑖β𝑖′, where β𝑖 is the (𝑘𝑖 + 𝑘𝑖
∗) × 𝑟𝑖  matrix of the cointegrating 
coefficients and 
 
∆𝒙𝑖𝑡 = α𝑖β𝑖′(𝒛𝑖,𝑡−1 − 𝚼𝑖𝒅𝑡−1) + 𝑩𝑖0
∗ ∆𝒙𝑖𝑡
∗ + 𝚪𝑖∆𝒛𝑖,𝑡−1 +𝚷𝑖𝚼𝑖∆𝒅𝑡 + 𝒖𝑖𝑡  (10) 
 
The 𝑟𝑖 error correction terms of the model can now be written as: 
 
𝜉𝑖𝑡 = β𝑖′𝒛𝑖,𝑡−β𝑖′𝚼𝑖𝒅𝑡 = β𝑖𝑥 ′𝒙𝑖𝑡 + β𝑖𝑥∗′𝒙𝑖𝑡
∗ + γ𝑖′𝒅𝑡 
 
The 𝜉𝑖𝑡  are mean zero 𝑟𝑖 ×1 vectors of disequilibrium deviations from the long run 
relationships. Forecasts and counter-factuals are invariant to the just-identifying restrictions 
used to identify β𝑖′. To establish whether there are changes in the reduced form parameters, 
we do not need to identify either the structural shocks or the cointegrating vectors.  
Notice that if 𝑟𝑖 = 0 in (10), this gives a first difference model and if 𝑟𝑖 = 𝑘 this gives 
an unrestricted levels VARX* (8). 
 
5.3 Model Selection 
 
We wish to examine whether there was a break at time 𝑇0, the end of 1998Q4. To do 
this, we estimate (10) using the whole sample: 1979Q4-2016Q4, which we call period 0; 
then for period 1 (1979Q4-1998Q4) and period 2 (1999Q1-2016Q4) and examine the extent 
to which allowing for a structural break improves the fit. In estimating (10), for each country 
we have to (a) choose lag-length for endogenous and exogenous variables, (𝑝𝑒𝑖 , 𝑝𝑥𝑖), which 
are set to a maximum of (2,2), (b) choose the number of cointegrating vectors 𝑟𝑖 and (c) 
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judge the significance of any structural breaks. Although there are tests for each of these, 
some of which are non-standard, it seems better to make the choices for the various 
elements within a consistent framework. This can be done using information criteria, IC.  
If model i has 𝑘𝑖 estimated parameters and maximised log likelihood 𝑀𝐿𝐿𝑖 the Akaike 
information criterion is 𝐴𝐼𝐶𝑖 = 𝑀𝐿𝐿𝑖 − 𝑘𝑖. The Schwarz Bayesian information criterion is 
𝐵𝐼𝐶𝑖 = 𝑀𝐿𝐿𝑖 − 0.4 × 𝑘𝑖 × ln𝑇, where T is the sample size
3. Two models are estimated, one 
using (𝑝𝑒𝑖
𝐴 , 𝑝𝑥𝑖
𝐴 ) and 𝑟𝑖
𝐴 chosen on the basis of AIC and one using (𝑝𝑒𝑖
𝐵 , 𝑝𝑥𝑖
𝐵 ) and 𝑟𝑖
𝐵 chosen on 
the basis of BIC. We use period 1, pre-euro, data to make the choice. 
In the case of nested models, which is what we will be concerned with, the information 
criteria can be interpreted as likelihood ratio tests. Suppose that the unrestricted model with 
𝑀𝐿𝐿𝑈 has one more parameter than the restricted model with 𝑀𝐿𝐿𝑅. Then a standard 
likelihood ratio test with probability of type I error, α=5%, would choose the unrestricted 
model if 𝐿𝑅 = 2(𝑀𝐿𝐿𝑈 −𝑀𝐿𝐿𝑅) > 3.84. The AIC would choose the unrestricted model if 
2(𝑀𝐿𝐿𝑈 −𝑀𝐿𝐿𝑅) > 2, corresponding to roughly to α=15%. The BIC would choose the 
unrestricted model if 2(𝑀𝐿𝐿𝑈 −𝑀𝐿𝐿𝑅) > ln 𝑇, which for T=100 is 4.6, which corresponds 
to roughly α=3%. The AIC and LR keep α constant and use any extra information to 
increase the power. They will reject any deviation from the null, however small, for a 
sufficiently large sample size. The BIC reduces α with the sample size, so the probabilities 
of both type I and type II errors fall with sample size. The BIC is consistent in that it will 
choose the true model as the sample size gets large, if the true model is in the set being 
considered. If the true model is not in the set being considered the AIC, including more 
parameters may provide a better approximation to it. By using both we can judge how 
robust our results are to possible over-fitting or under-fitting. 
We will use the difference between the sum of the IC for periods 1 and 2 and the IC for 
the whole period as an indication of the extent of the structural break. For the AIC, the 
difference is 𝐷𝐴 = 𝐴𝐼𝐶1 + 𝐴𝐼𝐶2 − 𝐴𝐼𝐶0 and 2𝐷𝐴 = 𝐿𝑅 − 𝐾, where K is the number of 
parameters. So the AIC choice corresponds to an LR test with a critical value of K. 
Similarly, 𝐷𝐵 = 𝐵𝐼𝐶1 + 𝐵𝐼𝐶2 − 𝐵𝐼𝐶0, which corresponds to an LR test with a critical value 
of K (ln 𝑇1 + ln𝑇2 − ln𝑇). The dimensions are 𝑇1 = 77, 𝑇2 = 72, T=149, and with 
(𝑝𝑒𝑖 , 𝑝𝑥𝑖) = (2,2) and 𝑟𝑖 = 6 there are 25 parameters in each equation. 
 
5.4 Conditioning 
 
In order to identify where the structural changes originate, we will condition on some 
elements of 𝒙𝑖𝑡, say 𝒙2,𝑖𝑡, in particular interest rates and exchange rates, and treat them as 
exogenous, in explaining 𝒙1,𝑖𝑡. The interpretation of this process follows Pesaran and Smith 
(1998). For clarity of exposition we abstract from the country identifier, i, the deterministic 
terms dt and the other exogenous foreign variables, 𝒙𝑖𝑡
∗ . Then (9) can be written as:  
 
∆𝒙𝑡 = 𝚷𝒙𝑡−1 + 𝚪∆𝒙𝑡−1 + 𝒖𝑡 (11) 
 
We now partition 𝒙𝑡 = (𝒙1,𝑡
′ , 𝒙2,𝑡
′ )′ to give: 
 
∆𝒙1𝑡 = 𝚷11𝒙1,𝑡−1 + 𝚷12𝒙2,𝑡−1 + 𝚪11∆𝒙1,𝑡−1 + 𝚪12∆𝒙2,𝑡−1 + 𝒖1𝑡 
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∆𝒙2𝑡 = 𝚷21𝒙1,𝑡−1 + 𝚷22𝒙2,𝑡−1 + 𝚪21∆𝒙1,𝑡−1 + 𝚪22∆𝒙2,𝑡−1 + 𝒖2𝑡 
where the covariance matrix of the reduced form disturbances is given by:  
 
𝚺 = (
𝚺11 𝚺12
𝚺21 𝚺22
) 
 
This partition does not impose any restrictions in itself, but provides a framework for 
examining how exogenous variables relate to the structure of the VAR.  
To condition 𝒙1𝑡 on current values of 𝒙2𝑡, define 𝐸(𝒖1𝑡|𝒖2𝑡) = 𝚺12𝚺22
−1𝒖2𝑡 = 𝚯𝒖2𝑡 
with 𝒖1𝑡 = 𝚯𝒖2𝑡 + 𝜂𝑡. The system for 𝒙1𝑡, can then be written: 
 
∆𝒙1𝑡 = (𝚷11 − 𝚯𝚷21)𝒙1,𝑡−1 + (𝚷12 −𝚯𝚷22)𝒙2,𝑡−1 + 𝚯∆𝒙2,𝑡
+ (𝚪11 − 𝚯𝚪21)∆𝒙1,𝑡−1 + (𝚪12 −𝚯𝚪22)∆𝒙2,𝑡−1 + 𝜂𝑡 
∆𝒙1𝑡 = 𝑩1𝒙1,𝑡−1 + 𝑩2𝒙2,𝑡−1 + 𝑪20∆𝒙2,𝑡 + 𝑪21∆𝒙1,𝑡−1 + 𝑪22∆𝒙2,𝑡−1 + 𝜂𝑡 
(12) 
 
By construction 𝐸(𝜂𝑡|Δ𝒙𝑡) = 𝟎, and the parameters of (12) can be estimated efficiently 
by OLS. Also denoting the (conditional) variance of 𝜂𝑡 by 𝚺𝜂𝜂 it is easily seen that  
 
𝚺𝜂𝜂 − 𝚺11 = −𝚺12𝚺22
−1𝚺21 ≤ 𝟎 
 
The variance of 𝜂𝑡 will generally be smaller than that of 𝒖1𝑡, so the parameters in the 
conditional model, (12), are likely to be estimated more precisely than the parameters of the 
unconditional model (11). Whether this is an advantage depends on what the economic 
parameters of interest are. If the parameters of interest are 𝚷 = (𝚷11, 𝚷12), it is clear from 
equation (12) that ∆𝒙2,𝑡 will be weakly exogenous for 𝚷11 only if either 𝚺12 = 𝟎, so that 
𝚯 = 𝟎, or if 𝚷2 = (𝚷21, 𝚷22) = 𝟎
4. In either of these cases the coefficient matrix on 
(𝒙1,𝑡−1, 𝒙2,𝑡−1) in the conditional model (12) will provide an estimate of 𝚷, otherwise it will 
not. In other cases, the economic parameters of interest may be the long-run effects of 𝒙2,𝑡 
on 𝒙1,𝑡 so one might be interested in (𝚷12 − 𝚯𝚷22) directly, in which case the model 
conditional on 𝒙𝑡 is appropriate whether or not 𝚷2 = 𝟎. 
For some purposes we are interested in the complete system but for other purposes we 
are interested in the responses to particular policy variables and how these responses 
changed with the introduction of the euro. In this case, the parameters of interest are the 
parameters of the conditional model (12). Of particular interest is the case where the 
parameters of the marginal model, the process generating the policy variables, interest rates 
and exchange rates, changed, shifting 𝚷21, 𝚪22 and 𝚯,but the parameters of the conditional 
model, 𝐁𝑖, 𝐂𝑖𝑗, did not change
5. 
 
6. SYSTEMS RESULTS 
 
The lag orders for the endogenous and exogenous variables (𝑝𝑒 , 𝑝𝑥) and the number of 
cointegrating vectors r could be chosen from the pre-euro sample; the post-euro sample or 
the whole sample. We determined them on the basis of the pre-euro sample, since any 
subsequent change will appear as a structural break. Thus for each country we estimate a 
cointegrating VARX* for period 1: 1979Q4-1988Q4, and use the AIC to determine 
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(𝑝𝑒𝑖
𝐴 , 𝑝𝑥𝑖
𝐴 ) and 𝑟𝑖
𝐴 and the BIC to determine (𝑝𝑒𝑖
𝐵 , 𝑝𝑥𝑖
𝐵 ) and 𝑟𝑖
𝐵. Using these values we estimate 
the AIC model and the BIC model for period 2: 1999Q1-2016Q4 and for period 0, with no 
break: 1979Q4-2016Q4. This gives the results summarised in the Table no. 4.  
As one would expect the AIC model tends to have larger values of (𝑝𝑒𝑖 , 𝑝𝑥𝑖) and 𝑟𝑖. In 
some cases such as Sweden, 𝑟𝑖
𝐴 = 6, indicating that all the variables are I(0), while 𝑟𝑖
𝐵 = 0, 
indicating that all the variables are I(1) and not cointegrated. The differences of AIC and 
BIC are all positive, indicating that the model with a break at the time of the euro formation 
is preferred. The differences are always smaller for the BIC than for the AIC because the 
BIC imposes a heavier penalty for the extra parameters in the break model. If we rank AIC 
by differences, the break seems smaller for the non-euro countries: Sweden had the 8th 
smallest difference, Norway 10th, UK 11th and Switzerland 12th. Among the euro countries, 
Finland ranked 9th had the smallest difference. The ranking by BIC is similar, the difference 
in ranks is small except for Sweden which goes from 8th by AIC to 4th by BIC. The table 
indicates that there is evidence for a break and it seems larger in the euro countries than the 
non-euro countries. 
 
Table no. 4 – Akaike and Bayesian Information Criteria for a euro structural break, m=6 
 Model r Order IC by Period Difference  
   e,x 0 1 2  Rank 
Austria A 5 1,1 3362.7 1799 1842.6 278.9 1 
 B 1 1,1 3238.5 1683 1727.3 171.8 1 
Belgium A 6 2,2 3377.8 1728.6 1866.4 217.2 6 
 B 1 1,1 3254.3 1625.6 1746.4 117.7 7 
Finland A 4 2,1 2240.2 1131.4 1256 147.2 9 
 B 0 1,1 2153.4 1054.6 1145.8 47 11 
France A 4 2,1 3524.1 1746.5 2024.3 246.7 3 
 B 0 1,1 3397.9 1655.3 1899.1 156.5 2 
Germany A 6 2,2 3508.3 1775.7 1956.5 223.9 4 
 B 3 1,1 3365.5 1658 1831.9 124.4 5 
Italy A 6 2,2 3182.2 1580.4 1800.7 198.9 7 
 B 1 1,1 3034.6 1460.4 1678.5 104.4 8 
Netherlands A 6 2,1 3547.7 1792.9 1975.4 220.6 5 
 B 1 1,1 3435.2 1698.8 1856.6 120.2 6 
Norway A 5 2,1 3041.2 1569.7 1615.6 144.1 10 
 B 2 1,1 2871.6 1451.8 1507.2 87.4 9 
Spain A 6 2,1 3141.1 1620.1 1770.2 249.2 2 
 B 1 1,1 2973.7 1474.7 1647.7 148.7 3 
Sweden A 6 2,1 3093.8 1507.1 1768.9 182.2 8 
 B 0 1,1 2948.8 1404.6 1670.3 126.1 4 
Switzerland A 4 2,1 3423.9 1765.5 1740.2 81.8 12 
 B 0 1,1 3294.3 1649.3 1660.2 15.2 12 
UK A 5 1,1 3409.9 1711.7 1839.1 140.9 11 
 B 2 1,1 3283.1 1596.6 1749.1 62.6 10 
Notes: Model A is chosen by AIC, Model B by BIC. r is the number of cointegrating vectors. e,x gives the 
lag orders on endogenous and exogenous variables. The information criteria are given for periods: 0: 
1979Q4-2016Q4; 1: 1979Q4-1998Q4; 2: 1999Q1-2016Q4. Difference gives the value for IC0-(IC1+IC2), 
rank gives rank of the difference. Endogenous variables are y, dp, eq, ep, r, lr; except Finland where lr is not 
available. Exogenous variables are ys, dps, eqs, rs, lrs, poil. 
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We next repeat the exercise treating 𝑟𝑖𝑡 , the short interest rate as exogenous, since it is 
controlled externally by the ECB for the euro countries in the second period (Table no. 5). 
 
Table no. 5 – Akaike and Bayesian Information Criteria for a euro structural break, m=6 
 Model 
k=6 k=5 k=4 
 Criterion 
Austria A 278.90 95.90 75.10 
 B 171.80 -2.80 -10.10 
Belgium A 217.20 106.70 82.20 
 B 117.70 -1.70 -14.30 
Finland A 147.20 56.17 39.50 
 B 47.00 -27.67 -13.50 
France A 246.70 132.10 110.70 
 B 156.50 51.60 51.10 
Germany A 223.90 152.90 120.80 
 B 124.40 59.90 33.30 
Italy A 198.90 152.70 123.60 
 B 104.40 69.90 72.10 
Netherlands A 220.60 113.00 66.20 
 B 120.20 30.20 21.30 
Norway A 144.10 92.50 73.10 
 B 87.40 14.60 13.00 
Spain A 249.20 98.90 71.50 
 B 148.70 -16.80 -7.60 
Sweden A 182.20 97.60 78.60 
 B 126.10 45.00 15.40 
Switzerland A 81.80 63.70 36.60 
 B 15.20 -13.50 -16.40 
UK A 140.90 72.50 50.40 
 B 62.60 5.60 -6.10 
Notes: Difference in AIC, A, and BIC, B, between whole period and two sub-periods. For 3 
models. k=5: interest rates exogenous; k=4: interest rates and exchange rates exogenous. Negative 
value suggests no structural break. 
 
We thus see how large the structural break is controlling for interest rates. Since the 
size of the system changes from k=6 to k=5 (except for Finland where it changes from k=5 
to k=4), we again need to choose (𝑝𝑒𝑖
𝐴 , 𝑝𝑥𝑖
𝐴 ) and 𝑟𝑖
𝐴 and (𝑝𝑒𝑖
𝐵 , 𝑝𝑥𝑖
𝐵 ) and 𝑟𝑖
𝐵 on the first period 
data. Assuming the real exchange rate, 𝑒𝑝𝑖𝑡 , is controlled by the ECB, to an extent after the 
formation of the euro, we continue the analysis treating the exchange rate as exogenous. 
Hence, further reducing the number of endogenous variables in the system, from k=5 to k=4, 
except for Finland (in which case k=4 is reduced to k=3). The table gives the differences in 
the AIC and BIC between the whole period and the sum of the two sub-periods for the three 
cases. For k=6, the first column, the differences are the same as in the previous table. When 
one controls for the short interest rate and exchange rate, there is clearly less evidence for a 
structural break, suggesting that the main breaks came in interest rate and exchange rate 
equations. For half of the sample, namely for Austria, Belgium, Finland, Spain, Switzerland, 
and the UK, the difference of BIC is negative, meaning the model estimated over the whole 
period is preferred. The big reduction appears to come from the interest rate equation. 
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Table no. 6 – Mean Error of Forecast 1999Q1-2016Q4, GDP 
 Level Growth 
 Single System Single System 
Austria 0.84 -0.05 -0.07 -0.05 
Belgium 5.20 1.32 0.09 0.04 
Finland 10.33 -1.96 -0.16 -0.15 
France 3.88 0.22 -0.05 -0.06 
Germany -0.07 -2.61 0.02 0.05 
Italy -6.79 -8.94 0.35 -0.31 
Netherlands -5.95 -4.79 -0.16 -0.14 
Norway -11.02 -9.32 -0.32 -0.28 
Spain -8.80 -1.67 -0.15 -0.17 
Sweden 14.65 10.94 0.31 0.37 
Switzerland 13.10 3.05 0.15 0.08 
UK -58.78 0.74 -0.04 -0.13 
Notes: Level in percent; Growth in percentage points at annual rates. 
 
We compared the system and single equation results (Table no. 6). The level equations 
for log GDP seem unreliable, the series seem to be difference stationary rather than trend 
stationary. The mean errors of forecast for growth rates from systems and single equation 
estimates always the same sign and very similar in magnitude, difference less than 0.05 
except for Sweden, Switzerland and UK. Of the non-euro countries 2 out of 4 did worse 
than expected. The outliers among the 12 are non-euro: Sweden had the largest positive 
difference of actual over expected; Norway the largest negative difference. Of the euro 
countries 6 out of 8 did worse than expected. Germany and Belgium did slightly better, Italy 
much worse, Spain and Netherlands quite a lot worse. 
 
7. CONCLUSION 
 
From this analysis we can only really conclude that it is difficult to draw strong 
conclusions. The results are sensitive to a range of specification choices and the confidence 
intervals around counterfactuals are large. The main structural break seems to be in the interest 
and exchange rate equations, where there was a clear institutional change in their 
determination with the introduction of the euro. The date of the formation of euro is not 
identified as the most likely date for a structural break in the GDP equations and the GDP 
growth rate equation shows no structural break for many countries. There do not appear to be 
obvious differences in the patterns of structural breaks between euro and non-euro country 
equations. The effects of the euro are apparent everywhere except in the main macroeconomic 
equations. This may be significant. The formation of the euro was a major break which 
required a change in the patterns of economic relationships to provide alternative methods of 
economic adjustment to changes in interest and exchange rates. The fact that the economic 
relationships did not seem to have changed may have been a source of tensions for the euro. 
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ANNEX 
Forecasts (the level of log GDP) 
Plots of Actual and Single Equation Dynamic Forecast(s) of Y 
Austria Belgium 
  
  
Finland France 
  
  
Germany Italy 
  
  
Netherlands Norway 
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Spain Sweden 
  
  
Switzerland United Kingdom 
  
 
 
Notes 
 
1 See, for instance, Chapter 20 of Pesaran (2015). 
2 This is unlikely to apply to a large economy like the US which may influence world interest rates. 
But it seems reasonable for the European countries we consider. 
3 Some programs report -2 times these numbers. 
4 When the restrictions 𝚷2 = 𝟎 hold, 𝒙2𝑡 is referred to as “long-run forcing” for 𝒙1𝑡. This is different 
from Granger non-causality, GNC. 𝒙2𝑡 is said to be GNC for 𝒙1𝑡 if 𝚷12 = 𝟎 and 𝚪12 = 𝟎; 𝒙2𝑡 does not 
predict 𝒙1𝑡. If 𝚷2 = 𝟎, 𝒙2𝑡 cannot themselves be cointegrated..
 
5 As is clear from (7) the Lucas critique says that any change in the marginal model determining policy 
will change the conditional model. 
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